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Abstract
We propose an asynchronous distributed average consensus algorithm that guarantees information-theoretic privacy of honest
agents’ inputs against colluding passive adversarial agents, as long as the set of colluding passive adversarial agents is not
a vertex cut in the underlying communication network. This implies that a network with (t + 1)-connectivity guarantees
information-theoretic privacy of honest agents’ inputs against any t colluding agents. The proposed protocol is formed by
composing a distributed privacy mechanism we provide with any (non-private) distributed average consensus algorithm. The
agent’ inputs are bounded integers, where the bounds are apriori known to all the agents.
Key words: Privacy; distributed average consensus.
1 Introduction
Algorithms for distributed average consensus allow
agents in a peer-to-peer network to compute the average
of all the agents’ inputs [16, 22, 28]. Some well-known
applications of distributed average consensus include
sensor fusion in multi-sensor networks [21, 23], dis-
tributed computation of support vector machines [8],
and solving economic-dispatch problems in smart grids
[29]. Distributed average consensus can also be used in
peer-to-peer networks for voting or monitoring.
Typical distributed average consensus algorithms re-
quire agents to share their inputs with their neighbors
[1, 3, 4, 16, 22, 26, 28]. This infringes agents’ privacy,
which is undesirable as certain agents in the network
might not be trustworthy.
In this paper, we show how to construct distributed av-
erage consensus protocols, if the inputs of the agents are
integers, that ensure privacy of honest agents’ inputs in
the presence of passive adversarial agents (also known as
semi-honest agents [2]) in the network. Passive adversar-
ial agents are assumed to follow the prescribed protocol,
but may try to use the information learned during execu-
tion of the protocol to infer something about the inputs
of other agents. Our notion of privacy is adopted from the
field of information-theoretic secure multi-party compu-
tation (MPC) [2, 11]: it ensures that colluding adver-
sarial agents learn nothing, in an information-theoretic
sense, about the collective inputs of the honest agents
? This work was supported by NSF Award #1111599 and by
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beyond learning the average value of the honest agents’
inputs. The latter is unavoidable, as it can be deduced
from the global average whose computation is the pur-
pose of running the consensus algorithm.
While privacy can often be achieved by relying on generic
completeness theorems for (information-theoretic) se-
cure multi-party computation [2, 6, 11], those results do
not immediately apply to our setting because they as-
sume a complete network with a dedicated communica-
tion channel between each pair of agents. In contrast, we
are interested in algorithms that can be used regardless
of the underlying network topology. There are few results
in that setting. Garay et al. [9] studied secure computa-
tion in incomplete networks, and showed that arbitrary
functions can be computed with information-theoretic
privacy against t colluding semi-honest agents so long as
the communication network is (t + 1)-connected. How-
ever, their work relies on protocols for secure message
transmission [7] that emulate pairwise channels between
every pair of agents over an incomplete network. In addi-
tion to incurring a significant cost in terms of round- and
message-complexity, relying on secure message transmis-
sion also requires the agents to have complete knowledge
of the network topology. The protocol we propose here
adds minimal cost to existing distributed average con-
sensus protocols, and only requires agents to be aware of
their neighbors. It is nevertheless interesting to observe
that our results also require (t + 1)-connectivity in or-
der to guarantee privacy against arbitrary subsets of t
colluding agents.
There have been proposals [14, 20] for achieving differen-
tial privacy by having agents add independent local noise
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to intermediate values (also referred as states) computed
during an execution of a distributed average consensus
protocol. As the added noise is independent, it induces
a loss in accuracy [5, 20]; i.e., the agents are only able to
compute an approximation of the true average (rather
than the exact average), and there is an inherent trade-
off between privacy and the achievable accuracy.
To overcome the trade-off, [18, 19] proposed protocols
where the local noise (or random values) added by an
agent is subtracted over time (or iterations), allowing
agents to converge to the exact average of the agents’ in-
puts while preserving privacy of an honest agent’s input
if the honest agent has at least one honest neighbor that
has no adversarial neighbor. In the privacy protocol pro-
posed in this paper, agents add correlated random values
to their inputs instead of adding local independent ran-
dom values (refer Section 3). The correlation between
the random values enforce their sum to zero. The pro-
posed protocol preserves privacy (in the formal sense as
stated in Definition 5 of Section 2) of the collective in-
puts of a group of honest agents if the group of honest
agents is not cut (defined in Section 2) by the passive
adversarial agents in the communication network (for-
mally stated in Section 5). This implies that the pro-
posed protocol preserves privacy of an honest agent’s
input if the honest agent has at least one honest neigh-
bor in the communication network. Moreover, privacy
results in [15, 18, 19, 20] do not hold if the agents’ in-
puts are bounded integers, where the bounds are apriori
known to all the agents.
Authors in [25] proposes of using appropriate edge
weights in the underlying communication network topol-
ogy to limit the observability of the distributed average
consensus algorithm. However, the proposed scheme
in [25] does not protect privacy of an honest agent if
any one of its neighbors is adversarial or semi-honest.
Whereas, our proposed privacy protocol can preserve
privacy of all the honest agents if the semi-honest agents
do cut them in the underlying communication network
topology which means that every honest agent can have
a semi-honest neighbor as long as the group of hon-
est agents remain connected. The scheme of Gupta et
al. [12] assumes a centralized, trusted authority that
distributes information to all agents each time they wish
to run the consensus algorithm.
While protocols based on homomorphic encryp-
tion [17, 27] can achieve strong privacy guarantees,
they rely on Paillier cryptosystem which relies on the
decisional composite residuosity assumption which im-
plicitly assumes bounded computation power of passive
adversarial agents [24]. In this paper, we focus on statis-
tical privacy of honest agents’ inputs regardless of the
computation power of the passive adversarial agents.
We also note that some of the above solutions [14, 18, 19]
require synchronous execution by the agents, whereas
our proposed protocol is asynchronous (refer Section 3).
The proposed privacy protocol is particularly designed
for the case when agents’ inputs are bounded (apriori
known) integers. This is often the case in practice as ev-
ery machine (or electronic device) registers a value using
only finite number of bits. Therefore, an agents’ input
can only be of finite precision and thus, can be mapped
to an integer using proper scaling, without loss of gener-
ality 1 . However, the agents can compute the exact av-
erage of their inputs using our proposed protocol, that
is the average of the inputs need not be an integer.
Note: We assume that every agent has prior knowledge
of the total number of agents in the network.
1.1 Summary of Our Contribution
We propose a general approach for achieving privacy
in distributed average consensus protocols where the
agents inputs are integers of known bound. Our approach
involves two phases:
(1) In the first phase, each agent shares correlated ran-
dom values to its neighbors and then computes a
new, “effective input” based on its original input
and the random values it shared with its neighbors.
(2) In the second phase, the agents run an arbitrary
distributed average consensus protocol (e.g., flood-
ing or any other protocol from the literature [4, 16,
22, 28]) using their effective inputs computed in the
first phase rather than their original inputs.
We show that the above, two-step process correctly com-
putes the average value of the agents’ original inputs as
long as the average consensus protocol used in the second
phase is correct. This follows from the fact that the first
phase is designed to ensure that the sum of the agents’
effective inputs is equal to the sum of their original in-
puts under an appropriate modulo operation. We also
show that privacy holds in our approach—in a formal
sense and under certain conditions, as discussed below—
regardless of the average consensus protocol used in the
second phase. We prove this by showing that privacy
holds even if all the effective inputs of the honest agents
are revealed to the colluding semi-honest parties.
Our notion of privacy is adopted from the literature
on information-theoretic secure multi-party computa-
tion [11]. Intuitively speaking, the privacy guarantee is
that the entire view (defined formally later) of a group
of colluding agents throughout the execution of our pro-
tocol can be simulated by those agents given (1) their
original inputs and (2) the average of the original inputs
1 Any number σ of finite precision can represented as σ =
x× 10e where both the significand s and the exponent e are
integers. The exponent e can be common for all the agents
if the bound on the inputs is known to all the agents.
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of the honest agents (or, equivalently, the average of the
original inputs of all the agents in the network). This
holds regardless of the true inputs of the honest agents.
As a consequence, this gives an intuition that that the
colluding adversarial agents learn nothing more about
the collective inputs of the honest agents from an ex-
ecution of the protocol other than the averages of the
honest agents’ inputs, and this holds regardless of any
prior knowledge the adversarial agents may have about
the inputs of (some of) the honest agents, or the distri-
bution of those inputs. We prove that our protocol satis-
fies this notion of privacy as long as the set of colluding
semi-honest agents does not constitute a vertex cut of
the network topology.
Our privacy-preserving protocol was previously de-
scribed in the conference version of our paper [13]. How-
ever, the privacy definition we use here is stronger, and
this version includes full proofs for our privacy claims.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
We let Z denote the set of integers, and let Zq denote
the set of integers {0, . . . , q − 1}. For a finite set S, we
let |S| denote its cardinality; for an integer q, we let
|q| denote its absolute value. If x is an n-dimensional
vector, then xi denotes its ith element and
∑
i xi simply
denotes the sum of all its elements (unless the range of
i is specifically mentioned). We use 1n to denote the n-
dimensional vector all of whose elements is 1.
A simple undirected graph is represented as G = {V, E}
where the nodes V , {1, . . . , n} denote the agents, and
there is an edge {i, j} ∈ E iff there is a direct communi-
cation channel between agents i and j. We let Ni denote
the set of neighbors of an agent i ∈ V, i.e., j ∈ Ni if and
only if {i, j} ∈ E . Note that i 6∈ Ni since G is a simple
graph.
We say two agents i, j are connected if there is a path
from i to j; since we consider undirected graphs, this no-
tion is symmetric. We let pi,j denote an arbitrary path
between i and j, when one exists. A graph G is connected
if every distinct pair of nodes is connected; note that a
single-node graph is connected.
Definition 1 (Vertex cut) A set of nodes Vcut ⊂ V is a
vertex cut of a graph G = {V, E} if removing the nodes
in Vcut (and the edges incident to those nodes) renders
the resulting graph unconnected. In this case, we say that
Vcut cuts V \ Vcut.
A graph is k-connected if the smallest vertex cut of the
graph contains k nodes.
Let G = {V, E} be a graph. The subgraph induced by
V ′ ⊂ V is the graph G′ = {V ′, E ′} where E ′ ⊂ E is the set
of edges entirely within V ′ (i.e., E ′ = {{i, j} ∈ E | i, j ∈
V ′}). We say a graph G = {V, E} has c connected compo-
nents if its vertex set V can be partitioned into disjoint
sets V1, . . . ,Vc such that (1) G has no edges between Vi
and Vj for i 6= j and (2) for all i, the subgraph induced
by Vi is connected. Clearly, if G is connected then it has
one connected component.
For a graph G = {V, E}, we define its incidence matrix
∇ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}|V|×|E| (see [10]) to be the matrix with |V|
rows and |E| columns in which
∇i, e =

1 if e = {i, j} and i < j
−1 if e = {i, j} and i > j
0 otherwise.
Note that 1Tn ·∇ = 0. We use ∇∗,e to denote the column
of ∇ corresponding to the edge e ∈ E .
We rely on the following result [10, Theorem 8.3.1]:
Lemma 1 Let G be an n-node graph with incidence ma-
trix ∇. Then rank(∇) = n− c, where c is the number of
connected components of G.
2.1 Problem Formulation
We consider a network of n agents where the commu-
nication network between agents is represented by an
undirected, simple graph G = {V, E}; that is, agents i
and j have a direct communication link between them
iff {i, j} ∈ E . The communication channel between
two nodes is assumed to be both private and authen-
tic; equivalently, in our adversarial model we do not
consider an adversary who can eavesdrop on commu-
nications between honest agents, or tamper with their
communication.
Each agent i holds a (private) input si ∈ Zq = {0, . . . , q−
1} for some publicly known, integer bound q > 1. The
inputs could even be negative, and the range of inputs
is restricted to non-negative values only for the sake of
exposition 2 .
We let s = [s1, . . . , sn]
T . A distributed average con-
sensus algorithm is an interactive protocol allowing the
agents in the network to each compute the average of the
agents’ inputs, i.e., after execution of the protocol each
agent outputs the value s¯ = 1n ·
∑
i si. We are interested
in distributed average consensus algorithms (or proto-
cols) that ensure privacy of agents against some fraction
of passive adversarial agents in the network.
We let C ⊂ V denote the set of adversarial agents, and
let H = V \ C denote the remaining honest agents.
2 Suppose that the input of an agent i, let it be xi, belongs
to {q1, . . . , q2}, where q1 ≤ q2 ∈ Z are known. Then, we can
shift xi to si = xi − q1 ∈ {0, . . . , q2 − q1} and compute the
average of {xi} as ∑i xi/n =∑i si/n+ qi.
3
Definition 2 View of adversarial agents in C is an in-
formation set consisting of the inputs, internal states and
received protocol messages of all the agents in C during
an execution of the protocol.
Privacy requires that the entire view of the adversar-
ial agents does not provide any information about the
inputs of honest agents other than the sum of their in-
puts, which is unavoidable if the privacy protocol does
not affect the accuracy of the average value of the inputs
(which is the case here) and all the agents (including ad-
versarial agents) learn the value of
∑
i si = ns¯ (assum-
ing n is known apriori to all the agents). This privacy
definition is formalized below.
Let sC denote a set of inputs held by the adversarial
agents, and sH a set of inputs held by the honest agents.
Fixing some protocol, we define ViewC(s) as follows:
Definition 3 ViewC(s) is a random variable 3 denoting
the view of the adversarial agents C in an execution of
the distributed average consensus protocol when all the
agents begin holding inputs s.
Then,
Definition 4 A distributed average consensus protocol
is (perfectly) C-private if for all s, s′ ∈ Znq such that
sC = s′C and
∑
i∈H si =
∑
i∈H s
′
i, the distributions of
ViewC(s) and ViewC(s′) are identical.
We remark that this definition makes sense even if |C| =
n−1, though in that case the definition is vacuous since
sH =
∑
i∈H si and so revealing the sum of the honest
agents’ inputs reveals the (single) honest agent’s input.
Implication: The above privacy definition equivalently
states that for any distribution S (known to the collud-
ing adversarial agents) over the honest agents’ inputs,
the distribution of the honest agents’ inputs conditioned
on the adversarial agents’ view is identical to the distri-
bution of the honest agents’ inputs conditioned on their
sum.
The assumptions made in this paper are-
(A1) The underlying communication network topology
G is undirected.
(A2) The agents’ inputs are bounded integers, with
bounds known to all the agents.
(A3) The adversarial agents are passive, i.e. they follow
the prescribed protocol but can use information
3 ViewC(s) can be assumed to be a random variable with-
out loss of generality, as any deterministic variable is just a
special random variable with probability equal to 1 at the
value of the variable and 0 elsewhere.
gathered by them during an execution of the proto-
col to determine information about the remain hon-
est agents’ inputs. The adversarial agents collude.
(A4) The communication links between the agents are
private and authenticated 4 .
3 Private Distributed Average Consensus
As described previously, our protocol has a two-phase
structure. In the first phase, each agent i computes an
“effective input” s˜i based on its original input si and
random values it sends to its neighbors; this is done
while ensuring that
∑
i s˜i mod p is equal to
∑
i si for
some publicly known integer p (see below). In the second
phase, the agents use any (correct) distributed average
consensus protocol Π to compute the average of {ns˜i}
or equivalently
∑
i s˜i, reduce that result modulo p, and
then divide by n. This clearly gives the correct average
1
n ·
∑
i si, and thus all that remains is to analyze privacy.
Note that we do not require the final average of the in-
puts to be integer.
It may at first seem strange that we can prove privacy of
our algorithm without knowing anything about the dis-
tributed average consensus protocol Π used in the sec-
ond phase of our algorithm. We do this by making a
“worst-case” assumption about Π, namely, that it sim-
ply reveals all the agents’ inputs to all the agents! Such
an algorithm is, of course, not at all private; for our pur-
poses, however, this does not immediately violate pri-
vacy because Π is run on the agents’ effective inputs {s˜i}
rather than their true inputs {si}.
If assumption (A4) holds, then the view of the adversar-
ial agents consist of the initial inputs of the agents in C,
their internal states and all the protocol messages they
receive throughout execution of the first phase of our
protocol, and the vector s˜ = [s˜1, . . . , s˜n]
T of all agents’
effective inputs at the end of the first phase. The defini-
tion of privacy (cf. Definition 4) remains unchanged.
Before continuing with an analysis of privacy, we de-
scribe our first-phase algorithm. Henceforth, assump-
tions (A1) - (A3) holds by default.
Let p be an integer such that p > n · (q − 1) ≥ ∑i si.
The first phase of our protocol proceeds as follows:
(1) Each agent i ∈ V chooses independent, uniform
values rij ∈ Zp for all j ∈ Ni, and sends rij to
agent j.
(2) Each agent i ∈ V computes a mask ai ∈ Zp as,
ai =
∑
j∈Ni
(rji − rij) mod p, (1)
4 Alternately, private and authentic communication can be
ensured using standard cryptographic techniques
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(3) Each agent i ∈ V computes effective input
s˜i = (si + ai) mod p. (2)
If assumption (A3) holds then∑
i
s˜i =
∑
i
si +
∑
i
ai mod p.
Moreover,∑
i
ai =
∑
i
∑
j∈Ni
(rji − rij) = 0 mod p,
since G is undirected. Thus, ∑i s˜i = ∑i si mod p. Since∑
i si < p by choice of p, this implies that
∑
i s˜i mod p is
equal to
∑
i si over the integers, and hence correctness of
our overall algorithm (i.e., including the second phase)
follows.
Note that any two neighboring agents i and j choose val-
ues rij and rji, respectively, independently. Agents i and
j then transmit these values rij and rji, respectively to
each other in an independent manner as well 5 . There-
fore, Step 1 does not require synchronicity between any
two agents. Steps 2 and 3 are performed locally, and
therefore synchronicity between agents is out of ques-
tion. Once an agent completes the first-phase, it floods
the network with this information regardless of whether
any other agent has completed the first-phase or not. As
every agent has prior knowledge of the total number of
agents, the agents reach an agreement on the comple-
tion of the first-phase when G is connected. Hence, the
first-phase is asynchronous and this implies that the pro-
posed protocol is asynchronous if the distributed average
consensus protocol in the second-phase is asynchronous.
In the second-phase, the agents can use an asynchronous
distributed average consensus protocol, such as the ran-
domized gossip algorithm [4], to compute the average
value of {ns˜i}, which equal to
∑
i s˜i.
3.1 Privacy Analysis
We show here that C-privacy holds as long as C is not a
vertex cut of G.
For an edge e = {i, j} in the graph with i < j, define
be = rji − rij mod p.
Let b = [be1 , . . .] be the collection of such values for all
the edges in G. If we let a = [a1, . . . , an]T denote the
masks used by the agents, then we have
a = ∇ · b mod p.
5 Agent i transmits rij regardless of whether it has received
rji or not. Same applies for agent j.
Since the rij are uniform and independent in Zp, it is
easy to see that the values {be}e∈E are uniform and inde-
pendent in Zp as well 6 . Thus, a is uniformly distributed
over the vectors in the span (over Zp) of the columns
of ∇, which we denote by L(∇). The following is proved
using the fact that rank(∇) = n−1 when G is connected
(cf. Lemma 1):
Lemma 2 Under assumptions (A1)- (A3), if G is con-
nected then a is uniformly distributed over Znp subject to
the constraint that
∑
i ai = 0 mod p.
A full proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix A.1.
Since s˜i = si + ai mod p, we have
Lemma 3 Under assumptions (A1)- (A3), if G is con-
nected then for a given value of s ∈ Znq the effective inputs
s˜ are uniformly distributed in Znp subject to the constraint
that
∑
i s˜i =
∑
i si mod p.
The proof of Lemma 3 is given in Appendix A.2.
The above implies privacy for the case when C = ∅,
i.e., when there are no adversarial agents. In that case,
the view of the adversary consists only of the effective
inputs s˜, and Lemma 3 shows that the distribution of
those values depends only on the sum of the agents’ true
inputs. Below, we extend this line of argument to the
case of nonempty C.
Fix some set C of adversarial agents, and recall that
H = V \ C. Let EC denote the set of edges incident to C,
and let EH = E \ EC be the edges incident only to honest
agents. Note that now the adversarial agents’ view con-
tains (information that allows it to compute) {be}e∈EC in
addition to the honest agents’ effective inputs {s˜i}i∈H.
The key observation enabling a proof of privacy is that
the values {be}e∈EH are uniform and independent in Zp
even conditioned on the values of {be}e∈EC . Thus, as long
as C is not a vertex cut of G, an argument as earlier
implies that the masks {ai}i∈H are uniformly distributed
in Z|H|p subject to
∑
i∈H
ai = −
∑
i∈C
ai = −
∑
i∈C
(∑
e∈EC
be · ∇i,e
)
mod p
given the values {be}e∈EC . Hence the effective inputs
{s˜i}i∈H are uniformly distributed in Z|H|p subject to∑
i∈H
s˜i =
∑
i∈H
si +
∑
i∈H
ai =
∑
i∈V
si −
∑
i∈C
s˜i mod p (3)
6 If x and y are two independent random variables in Zp
with at least one of them being uniformly distributed (in
Zp), then z = x+ y mod p is uniformly distributed in Zp.
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given the values of {be}e∈EC and the sum of the honest
agents’ inputs 7 . This implies,
Theorem 4 Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), if C is not
a vertex cut of G then our proposed distributed average
consensus protocol is perfectly C-private.
Formal proof of this theorem is given in Appendix A.3.
As a corollary, we have
Corollary 1 Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), if G is
(t + 1)-connected then for any C with |C| ≤ t our pro-
posed distributed average consensus protocol is perfectly
C-private.
4 Illustration
To demonstrate our proposed distributed average con-
sensus protocol we consider a simple network of 3 agents
with V = {1, 2, 3} and E = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}, as
shown in Fig. 1. Let the values of q and p be 10 and 30,
respectively. Consider an instance where s1 = 4, s2 = 7
and s3 = 3.
First phase:
(1) As shown in Fig. 1, all pair of adjacent agents i
and j exchange the respective values of rij and rji
(chosen independently and uniformly in Zp) with
each other. Consider a particular instance where
[r12, r21, r23, r32, r31, r13] = [14, 11, 17, 5, 3, 8]
(2) The agents compute their respective masks,
a1 = ((r21 − r12) + (r31 − r13)) mod p = 22
and similarly, a2 = 22 and a2 = 17. It is easy to
verify that (a1 + a2 + a3) mod 30 = 0.
(3) The agents compute their respective effective in-
puts,
s˜1 = (s1 + a1) mod p = (4 + 22) mod 30 = 26
and similarly, s˜2 = 28 and s˜3 = 20.
After the first phase, each agent uses a (non-private)
distributed average consensus protocol Π (as shown in
Fig. 1) in the second phase to compute
∑
i s˜i, which is
equal to
∑
i si = 14 under mod30.
Let C = {3} and so, EC = {{1, 3}, {2, 3}}. It is easy to
see that C does not cut the graph G and therefore, for
any pair of inputs s1 ∈ Z10 and s2 ∈ Z10 that satisfy
s1 + s2 = 11, s˜1 and s˜2 are uniformly distributed over
Z230 subject to s˜1 + s˜2 = 24 mod 30 (refer (3)).
7 Note that s˜i = si+ai = si+
∑
e∈EC be ·∇i,e mod p, ∀i ∈ C.
Fig. 1. Arrows represent the flow of information.
5 Extending Privacy
In this section, we present an extension of Theorem 4 for
the case when C is a vertex cut, by relaxing our definition
of C-privacy to (C, H)-privacy below. Here, the set H is
a subset of V \ C, i.e. we are now interested in privacy of
some of the honest agents instead of all honest agents.
(Apart from H, all other notations remain the same.)
Definition 5 A distributed average consensus protocol
is (perfectly) (C, H)-private if for all s, s′ ∈ Z|H|q subject
to sV\H = s′V\H and
∑
i∈H si =
∑
i∈H s
′
i, the distribu-
tions of ViewC(s) and ViewC(s′) are identical.
Similarly, we remark that this definition makes sense
even if |H| = 1, though in that case the definition is
vacuous since sH =
∑
i∈H si and so revealing the sum
of the inputs of the honest agents H reveals the (single)
honest agent’s input!
Essentially, if the view of the adversarial agents remains
same for any two sets of inputs of the honest agents H
that sum up to the same value then no information is
leaked to the adversarial agents about the inputs of H
other than their common sum. Note that C-privacy is
equivalent (C, V \ C)-privacy. Therefore, if a distributed
average consensus protocol is C-private then it is (C, H)-
private for all H ⊆ V \ C. This is the reason why Defini-
tion 5 is a relaxation of Definition 4. As another corollary
of Theorem 4, we have
Corollary 2 Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), if C does
not cut H then our proposed distributed average consen-
sus protocol (refer Section 3) is (C, H)-private.
As a consequence of Corollary 2, if an honest agent i
has an honest agent j then the adversarial agents can
not distinguish between two input values of si, s
′
i ∈ Z2q
and sj , s
′
j ∈ Z2q, respectively if si + sj = s′i + s′j . An
illustration of the above corollary is given below.
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Fig. 2. In this case, the adversarial agents C = {3, 5, 10} cut
the graph into 3 connected components with set of agents
H1 = {1, 2}, H2 = {4} and H3 = {6, 7, 8, 9} (and edges inci-
dent to the respective honest agents). As mentioned before,
our proposed distributed protocol preserves the privacy of
each group of honest agents Hi, i = 1, 2, 3 in the sense of
Definition 5. However, as |H2| = 1 the value of s4 gets re-
vealed to the adversarial agents.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a private (asynchronous) dis-
tributed average consensus protocol that guarantees
(perfect) privacy of honest agents’ inputs against a set
of passive adversarial or semi-honest agents if the set of
adversarial agents is not a vertex cut of the underlying
communication network. The only information that ad-
versarial agents can get on the inputs of honest agents
is their sum (or average). This reduces to having a net-
work of (t + 1)-connectivity for guaranteed privacy of
honest agents against if there are at most t number of
passive adversarial agents in the network. In an obvious
extension of this result, we conclude that our proposed
distributed average consensus protocol can preserve the
privacy of any subset of honest agents (in the network)
as long as that subset of honest agents are not cut by
the set of passive adversarial agents.
References
[1] Tuncer Can Aysal, Mehmet Ercan Yildiz, Anand D Sarwate,
and Anna Scaglione. Broadcast gossip algorithms for consen-
sus. IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, 57(7):2748–
2761, 2009.
[2] Michael Ben-Or, Shafi Goldwasser, and Avi Wigderson.
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant
distributed computation. In Proc. 20th Annual ACM Sym-
posium on Theory of Computing, pages 1–10. ACM, 1988.
[3] Florence Be´ne´zit, Vincent Blondel, Patrick Thiran, John
Tsitsiklis, and Martin Vetterli. Weighted gossip: Distributed
averaging using non-doubly stochastic matrices. In Infor-
mation Theory Proceedings (ISIT), pages 1753–1757. IEEE,
2010.
[4] Stephen Boyd, Arpita Ghosh, Balaji Prabhakar, and De-
vavrat Shah. Randomized gossip algorithms. IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking (TON), 14(SI):2508–2530, 2006.
[5] Paolo Braca, Riccardo Lazzeretti, Stefano Marano, and Vin-
cenzo Matta. Learning with privacy in consensus + obfusca-
tion. IEEE Signal Processing Letters, 23(9):1174–1178, 2016.
[6] David Chaum, Claude Cre´peau, and Ivan Damgard. Multi-
party unconditionally secure protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 11–19.
ACM, 1988.
[7] Danny Dolev, Cynthia Dwork, Orli Waarts, and Moti Yung.
Perfectly secure message transmission. J. ACM, 40(1):17–47,
1993.
[8] Pedro A Forero, Alfonso Cano, and Georgios B Giannakis.
Consensus-based distributed support vector machines. Jour-
nal of Machine Learning Research, 11(5):1663–1707, 2010.
[9] Juan Garay and Rafail Ostrovsky. Almost-everywhere secure
computation. In Advances in Cryptology—Eurocrypt 2008,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 307–323. Springer,
2008.
[10] Chris Godsil and Gordon Royle. Algebraic Graph Theory.
Springer, 2001.
[11] Oded Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Appli-
cations, volume 2. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[12] Nirupam Gupta and Nikhil Chopra. Confidentiality in dis-
tributed average information consensus. In 55th IEEE Conf.
on Decision and Control, pages 6709–6714. IEEE, 2016.
[13] Nirupam Gupta, Jonathan Katz, and Nikhil Chopra. Pri-
vacy in distributed average consensus. IFAC-PapersOnLine,
50(1):9515–9520, 2017.
[14] Zhenqi Huang, Sayan Mitra, and Geir Dullerud. Differen-
tially private iterative synchronous consensus. In Proc. ACM
Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, pages 81–90.
ACM, 2012.
[15] Zhenqi Huang, Sayan Mitra, and Nitin Vaidya. Differentially
private distributed optimization. In Proc. Intl. Conference
on Distributed Computing and Networking, page 4. ACM,
2015.
[16] Ali Jadbabaie, Jie Lin, and A Stephen Morse. Coordina-
tion of groups of mobile autonomous agents using nearest
neighbor rules. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
48(6):988–1001, 2003.
[17] Riccardo Lazzeretti, Steven Horn, Paolo Braca, and Peter
Willett. Secure multi-party consensus gossip algorithms. In
IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and
Signal Processing, pages 7406–7410. IEEE, 2014.
[18] Nicolaos E Manitara and Christoforos N Hadjicostis.
Privacy-preserving asymptotic average consensus. In Euro-
pean Control Conference, pages 760–765. IEEE, 2013.
[19] Yilin Mo and Richard M Murray. Privacy preserving aver-
age consensus. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
62(2):753–765, 2017.
[20] Erfan Nozari, Pavankumar Tallapragada, and Jorge Corte´s.
Differentially private average consensus: obstructions, trade-
offs, and optimal algorithm design. Automatica, 81:221–231,
2017.
[21] Reza Olfati-Saber. Distributed kalman filter with embedded
consensus filters. In 44th IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control, pages 8179–8184. IEEE, 2005.
[22] Reza Olfati-Saber, Alex Fax, and Richard M Murray. Con-
sensus and cooperation in networked multi-agent systems.
Proceedings of the IEEE, 95(1):215–233, 2007.
[23] Reza Olfati-Saber and Jeff S Shamma. Consensus filters
for sensor networks and distributed sensor fusion. In 44th
IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pages 6698–6703.
IEEE, 2005.
[24] Pascal Paillier. Public-key cryptosystems based on composite
degree residuosity classes. In International Conference on
the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques,
pages 223–238. Springer, 1999.
[25] Se´rgio Pequito, Soummya Kar, Shreyas Sundaram, and A Pe-
dro Aguiar. Design of communication networks for dis-
tributed computation with privacy guarantees. In 53rd
IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pages 1370–1376.
IEEE, 2014.
[26] Wei Ren, Randal W Beard, et al. Consensus seeking in
7
multiagent systems under dynamically changing interac-
tion topologies. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
50(5):655–661, 2005.
[27] Minghao Ruan, Huan Gao, and Yongqiang Wang. Secure
and privacy-preserving consensus. IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control, 2019.
[28] Lin Xiao and Stephen Boyd. Fast linear iterations for dis-
tributed averaging. Systems & Control Letters, 53(1):65–78,
2004.
[29] Shiping Yang, Sicong Tan, and Jian-Xin Xu. Consensus
based approach for economic dispatch problem in a smart
grid. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 28(4):4416–
4426, 2013.
A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is obvious for n = 1. Henceforth, n > 1.
Choose a subset E ′ of E with n − 1 edges such that
G′ = {V, E ′} is connected (such a subset E ′ is guaran-
teed to exist if G is connected). Therefore, all the n− 1
columns of ∇ correspondng to the edges in G′ are lin-
early independent (as incidence matrix of a connected
graph has independent columns). As all the non-zero el-
ements of ∇′ are either equal to −1 or 1 and {be}e∈E′
are uniformly distributed in Zn−1p , thus
a′ =
∑
e∈E′
∇∗,e · be mod p
is uniformly distributed over all pn−1 points 8 in
L(∇′) = {∇′ · b mod p | b ∈ Zn−1p },
where ∇′ is the incidence matrix of G′ with columns
{∇∗,e}e∈E′ . Note that 1Tn · a′ = 0 mod p as 1Tn∇′ = 0T|E|
(G′ is undirected, as per assumption (A1)).
From the method of induction we now prove that a is
also uniformly distributed over all pn−1 points in L(∇′).
For any integer 0 ≤ k < |E| − |E ′|, let
a(k) =
∑
e∈E(k)
∇∗,e · be mod p
where E(k) is the set of edges generated by adding any k
edges from E \ E ′ in E ′. Clearly, a0 = a′, which as shown
above is uniformly distributed over all pn−1 points in
L(∇′). Now, we show that if a(k) is uniformly distributed
over all pn−1 points in L(∇′) for some k then the same
8 As non-zero elements of {∇′∗,e}e∈E are −1 or 1, thus∑
e∈E′ ∇′∗,e · be mod p = 0 if and only if
∑
e∈E′ ∇′∗,e · be =∑
e∈E′ ∇′∗,e ·λep, where λe ∈ Z ∀ e ∈ E ′. Therefore, indepen-
dence of {∇′∗,e}e∈E′ implies that
∑
e∈E′ ∇′∗,e · be mod p = 0
if and only if be = 0 ∀ e ∈ E ′. Hence, every value of {be}e∈E′
generates a unique value of a′.
is true for a(k+1).
Let e(k+1) be an edge in E \ E(k+1) and
a(k+1) = a(k) +∇∗,e(k) · be(k+1) mod p.
As a(k) is assumed to be uniformly distributed over
L(∇′), we can substitute a(k) in equation above by∑
e∈E′ ∇∗,e · be mod p, be ∈ Z∀ e ∈ E ′. This implies,
a(k+1) =
∑
e∈E′
∇∗,e · be +∇∗,e(k) · be(k+1) mod p
As G′ is connected, thus 9
∇∗,e(k+1) =
∑
e∈E′
µe∇∗,e (A.1)
where, µe ∈ {−1, 0, 1} for all e ∈ E ′. Therefore,
a(k+1) =
∑
e∈E′
∇∗,e · (be + µebe(k+1)) mod p
As {be}e∈E′ is uniformly distributed over all points in
Zn−1p and be(k+1) is independent from all {be}e∈E′ , there-
fore {be + µebe(k+1) mod p}e∈E′ is uniformly distributed
over all the points in Zn−1p . Therefore, from above we
can infer that a(k+1) is also uniformly distributed over
all pn−1 points in L(∇′).
Induction of edges in this manner implies that a is
uniformly distributed over all pn−1 points in L(∇′)
(a(k+1) = a when k = |E| − |E ′| − 1). Combining this in-
ference with the fact that 1Tn ·a = 0 mod p as 1Tn∇ = 0T|E|
(G is undirected) implies that a is uniformly distributed
over Znp subject to the constraint:
∑
i ai = 0 mod p.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Since s˜i = si + ai mod p, and si, ai are independent
random variables, we get
Pr (s˜|s) = Pr (a = (s˜− s) mod p)
From Lemma 2 we know that
Pr(a) =
{
1/pn−1 ,
∑
i ai = 0 mod p
0 , otherwise
when G is connected. Therefore,
Pr(s˜|s) =
{
1/pn−1 ,
∑
i s˜i =
∑
i si mod p
0 , otherwise
9 It follows from the fact that there exists a path in G′ be-
tween the terminal nodes of the edge e(k+1) as G′ is con-
nected.
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when G is connected.
For a given value of s, there can be at most pn−1 values
of s˜ that satisfy
∑
i s˜i =
∑
i si mod p. Thus, the above
implies that s˜ are uniformly distributed in Znp subject to∑
i s˜i =
∑
i si mod p when G is connected.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Let GH = {H, EH} be the graph of honest agents (and
edges incident to only honest agents) and ∇H be its in-
cidence matrix. Note that GH is undirected as G is undi-
rected.
Due to assumption (A4), view of the adversarial agents
in C consists of the inputs of the adversarial agents, ef-
fective inputs of all the agents (internal states are depen-
dent only on the effective inputs of the agents in the sec-
ond=phase of the protocol) and random values shared
over edges incident to the adversarial agents in Step (1)
of the first-phase. Therefore,
ViewC(s) = {sC , {s˜i}, {be}e∈EC} .
Each ai can be decomposed as follows:
ai =
∑
e∈EH
∇i,e · be +
∑
e∈EC
∇i,e · be mod p
As the random values {be}e∈EH are uniformly and
independently distributed in Zp (given the values
{be}e∈EC ), this implies that the collection of random
values {∑e∈EH ∇i,ebe mod p}i∈H (vectors in L(∇H)) is
uniformly distributed over Z|H|p subject to the constraint
∑
i∈H
(∑
e∈EH
∇i,ebe
)
= 0 mod p
when GH is connected (cf. Lemma 2). Thus, if GH is
connected then
Pr(aH|{be}e∈EC )
=
{
1/p|H|−1 ,
∑
i∈H ai = −
∑
i∈C ai mod p
0 , otherwise
where, ai =
∑
e∈EC ∇i,e · be mod p, ∀i ∈ C and aH de-
notes the vector of honest agents masks {ai}i∈H.
Combining the above with the fact that s˜i = si+ai mod
p, ∀i, where si and ai are independent for all i, implies
that (s˜H is the vector of {s˜i}i∈H)
Pr (s˜H|sH, {be}e∈EC ) = 1/p|H|−1 (A.2)
for all the values s˜H in Z|H|p that satisfy∑
i∈H
s˜i =
∑
i∈H
si −
∑
i∈C
∑
e∈EC
∇i,ebe mod p
when GH is connected. Refer the proof of Lemma 3 for
further explanation on (A.2).
As {be}e∈E are independent to the inputs {si}, thus
Pr (s˜H|sH, {be}e∈EC ) =
Pr (s˜H, {be}e∈EC |sH)
Pr({be}e∈EC )
As ai =
∑
e∈EC ∇i,ebe mod p, ∀i ∈ C and s˜i = si +
ai mod p, ∀i, thus from (A.2) we get
Pr (ViewC(s)) ≡ Pr (ViewC(s′))
for all inputs s, s′ in Znq that satisfy sC = s′C and∑
i∈V si =
∑
i∈V s
′
i mod p when GH is connected.
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